Researchers have released a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum Bitcoin signature scheme, and are seeking community review. The paper estimates 121.4–122.7 bits of classical security, but that result depends on three unproven conjectures; the authors say their work is unfinished and should not yet be relied on for deployment.
Researcher Mikhail Kudinov announced the first version on Thursday. Dated Nov. 18, the analysis reduces SHRINCS’ security to properties of its underlying hash function. The team is still analyzing SM-DSPR, for which the current bound is conjectured, and working to tighten a reprogramming step and improve a bound against quantum attackers.
SHRINCS combines two hash-based designs under one key: a stateful component built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback based on SLH-DSA. Both use the same hash function, so the proof must cover both. Draft signature sizes range from 548 to 4,619 bytes for the stateful version and are 5,777 bytes for the fallback. Bitcoin Schnorr signatures are 64 bytes and ECDSA signatures are typically about 71 bytes; larger signatures use more block space and can reduce the number of transactions per block.
The stateful option uses one-time keys, so reusing a key could let an attacker forge a signature and steal funds. Wallets must track each key’s state; the stateless alternative avoids that risk but produces much larger signatures. On MARA Foundation TV, Blockstream research director Jonas Nick told foundation head Isabel Foxen Duke: “It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens,” and “Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly.” He also warned: “We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures,” and “And it’s not just the fee market, it’s also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin.”
Kudinov said the work has not received sufficient peer review. The project’s GitHub repository cautions that the documents may contain errors and should not be the sole basis for deploying SHRINCS. Kudinov wrote: “We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes,” and asked readers to report errors by opening an issue.
The researchers also published separate results they say apply beyond SHRINCS to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA: a classical bound for ITSR without reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. The work comes amid growing attention to quantum risks: a global securities regulators’ group warned this week that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may be especially difficult, while researchers recently developed a post-quantum defense for Lightning after a Bitcoin quantum-safe transaction was demonstrated without a fork. The SHRINCS draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal is open for comment. Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream, said: “We need all the possible feedback — engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers,” adding, “There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise.”




